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Introduction 
For a long enough time now, all countries have been 
discussing moving from a paper world to a digital one. 
The process is turning out to be not so fast, although 
eventually we humans should succeed. It is to be 
remarked that digital ‘objects’, i.e. not only what is 
generally recognised as ‘documents’ such as Word or 
pdf files, but also images, outputs created by 
Computer Aided Design programs, spreadsheets, 
music, and the like, have a requirement in common 
with their paper relatives: that is ‘preservation’, with 
the, not so slight, difference that preservation is 
entirely different in the two cases. One purpose 
between them is common, though: making it possible 
to retrieve and to ‘read’ preserved objects. A problem 
is the length of time that digital data can be 
preserved. It might be necessary to preserve digital 
data for decades,1 and maybe even longer: for 
example, notarial deeds are supposed to last forever. 
Preserving documents on paper seems very easy, but 
it is incredibly difficult to create back-ups, to use the 
Information Technology term, even more if these 
back-ups are located far from the ‘central’ 
preservation site, especially in case of ‘unique’ 
documents, such as where there is no ‘official’ copy. 
Making copies of ‘unique’ digital documents (think of 
digitally signed data), in contrast, takes seconds. This 
makes, in fact, the term ‘unique digital document’ an 
oxymoron.2 
There are two pillars relating to preserving digital 
objects: 
 
1. Ensuring it will be possible to later retrieve  
                                                          
1 Domestic legislation often sets out period of time that document 
have to be retained for certain categories of document, such as 
accounting records, and industries have different requirements for 
other types of document, depending on the nature of the work they 
undertake. 
2 An interesting and poetic digression on this topic can be found in 
an article by Stephen Mason, ‘Electronic evidence and the meaning 
of “original”’, Amicus Curiae The Journal of the Society for Advanced 
Legal Studies, Issue 79, Autumn 2009, 26 – 28, available at 
http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/2565/1/Amicus79_Mason.pdf  
 
them, even amongst billons of other digital 
objects, and to ‘read’ them. 
2. Ensuring they will not ‘disappear’, that is: 
they are ‘securely preserved’. 
The retrieval of digital data is covered by a number of 
ISO standards, the paterfamilias of which is ISO 
14721– Space data and information transfer systems -
- Open archival information system (OAIS) -- Reference 
model, originally produced by CCSDS (Consultative 
Committee for Space Data System) of the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration as a 
recommendation, and given the status of an ISO 
Standard in 2003. The current version is dated 2012. It 
‘addresses a full range of archival information 
preservation functions including ingest, archival 
storage, data management, access, and 
dissemination. It also addresses the migration of 
digital information to new media and forms, the data 
models used to represent the information, the role of 
software in information preservation, and the 
exchange of digital information among archives.’ 
Moreover, for each of the areas, it stresses the need 
to take care of the security of the preserved objects in 
order to prevent them from being deleted or modified 
or becoming illegible for any reason. However, it 
provides no security related measure. 
On the one hand, ISO 14721 strengthened, with its 
specifications, some of the previously existing 
standards, a few of which have been subsequently 
upgraded following the ISO 14721 path, and on the 
other hand it gave way to an ever increasing number 
of specifications, standards and legal instruments 
dealing with a number of topics: from how to create 
digital data, the creation of digital data from analogue 
documents (paper or other analogue media), up to 
how to set up metadata suitable to enable the 
retrieval of preserved objects.3 It is worth remarking 
                                                          
3 Among the umpteen documents and standards that now exist, it is 
worth reminding the reader of at least the following: ISO 15489-
1:2001 – Information and documentation -- Records management -- 
Part 1: General; ISO/TR 15489-2:2001 – Information and 
documentation -- Records management -- Part 2: Guidelines; ISO 
23081-1:2006 – Information and documentation -- Records 
management processes -- Metadata for records -- Part 1: Principles; 
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that this number of archival related standards is still 
increasing. 
Unfortunately none of these documents addresses in 
depth the other important topic: security in 
preserving digital data. Many of these standards and 
specifications recommend the reader to refer to 
ISO/IEC 27000 family of documents. Other ones, such 
as ISO/TR 15489-2, consider security in more depth, 
but not in enough detail to provide users with 
sufficient guidance. To give the reader an example, 
clause 4.2.5.2 of ISO/TR 15489-2 reads: 
‘Development of appropriate categories of 
access rights and restrictions is based on the 
organization’s regulatory framework analysis, 
business activity analysis and risk assessment. 
Reasonable security and access will depend on 
both the nature and size of the organization, 
as well as the content and value of the 
information requiring security.’ 
Further on, clause 4.3.7.1 reads: 
‘It is important to determine efficient and 
effective means of maintaining, handling and 
storing records before the records are created 
and then to reassess storage arrangements as 
the records’ requirements change. It is also 
important that storage choices be integrated 
with the overall records management 
programme.’ 
Similarly, other clauses provide more detailed 
recommendations, but readers can find just ‘what’ is 
to be done, not ‘how’ to do it in order to achieve 
preservation security. 
A change occurred in April 2012, when the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), one of 
the three European standardisations bodies officially 
recognised by the European Union Commission, 
published two documents marked ‘101 533’.4 These 
101 533 documents are: 
ETSI TS 101 533-1 v1.2.1 (2011-12) – 
Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); 
                                                                                                  
ISO 23081-2:2009 – Information and documentation -- Managing 
metadata for records -- Part 2: Conceptual and implementation 
issues; ISO/TR 23081-3:2011 – Information and documentation -- 
Managing metadata for records -- Part 3: Self-assessment method; 
ISO 30300:2011 – Information and documentation -- Management 
systems for records -- Fundamentals and vocabulary.  
4 Available in electronic format from 
http://pda.etsi.org/pda/queryform.asp. 
Data Preservation Systems Security; Part 1: 
Requirements for Implementation and 
Management 
ETSI TR 101 533-2 v1.2.1 (2011-12) – 
Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); 
Data Preservation Systems Security; Part 2: 
Guidelines for Assessors 
Before considering both these documents, we will 
first consider the most recent ISO standard related to 
digital archival: ISO 14641-1:2012 Electronic archiving 
-- Part 1: Specifications concerning the design and the 
operation of an information system for electronic 
information preservation (January 2012). 
ISO 14641-1  
This ISO standard, derived from the French norm 
AFNOR NF Z42-013,5 is declared as the first part of a 
family and provides what, despite the term used 
‘specifications’, are better to be referred to as 
‘policies’. The norm in fact describes ‘what’ is to be 
done, not ‘how’ it shall or should be done. The only 
exception is related to converting analogue 
documents (paper, parchment, video, chemical 
photograph, vinyl record, microform, etc.) into digital 
ones: there are six pages dedicated to this issue out of 
34 normative pages. Just to give the reader an idea of 
how deep this ISO 14641-1 goes in providing 
instructions on how to implement this analogue-to-
digital conversion, one sentence in clause 10.2.3.3 
‘Preparation of microform documents’, reminds the 
operator that ‘Microform documents shall, if 
necessary, be cleared of dust before digitization.’  
On the other hand, ISO 14641-1 makes a very 
important assertion with the following statement that 
is included in clause 13.2.1 ‘Service contract’, where 
item j) reads ‘insurance policies contracted by the 
third party covering any activity-related damages’. 
This addresses a very basic issue: preservation jointly 
with ‘archival’6 services must be provided by 
                                                          




6 It is worth mentioning the original distinction between ‘archival’ that 
addresses, in the main, the purpose of being able to retrieve 
archived digital objects (by means of metadata), assuming that their 
preservation is somehow assured, and ‘preservation’ that focusses 
on providing security measures suitable to ensure that the binary 
content of the preserved digital objects is not tampered with. The 
border between these two terms is somewhat reduced, since one 
cannot provide archival services without applying security measures 
suitable to ensure the digital objects integrity and, therefore, 
‘persistence’. 
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organisations that are financially robust enough, even 
to the extent of bolstering this financial strength with 
an insurance policy. To further streamline the matter, 
Italian Legislative Decree No 82 of 2005 (amended a 
number of times in order to keep it up to date), at 
article 44-bis (specific to ‘accredited’ digital 
preservation services), requires at paragraph 3 that 
accredited preservation providers be legal persons 
with at least 200.000,00 euros capital. The term 
‘accredited’ in this legislative instrument means 
‘recognised as fit for this type of services’ by Agenzia 
per l’Italia Digitale, an Italian governmental body that 
over time has changed its name several times: from 
AIPA (Agenzia per l’Informatica nella Pubblica 
Amministrazione), to CNIPA (Centro Nazionale per 
l’Informatica nella Pubblica Amministrazione), to 
DigitPA (just a name) and currently, but presumably 
not ‘finally’, to AgID.  
Very little is said in ISO 14641-1 about security and in 
particular on ‘information systems security’. Clause 
5.5 headed ‘Security’, provides some detail in sub-
clause 5.5.1, headed ‘Management and organization 
of security’. The clause reads: ‘NOTE – For security 
requirements, reference should be made to ISO/IEC 
27001 and associated standards.’ There are further 13 
more lines that, after having said ‘The management 
system for security shall be distinct and separate from 
the administration of information system operations 
or telecommunications systems’, lists 8 principles to 
be met to ensure security, among which is: 
‘management of the keys of premises, security 
systems for detection, intrusion and alarms; 
compliance of hardware with regulations concerning 
human safety’. And that is all on security. Similarly, 
risk assessment is dealt with in 16 lines in clause 5.5.2. 
Let us go through the gist of these 16 lines. After 
having recommended that preservation services must 
be proactive and not reactive, by drafting security 
policies, it states: ‘The organization shall undertake an 
information security risk analysis, and document the 
results obtained.’ The focus then moves on to dealing 
with storage media, both live and backup, by 
analysing ‘vulnerability risk factors’ that are 
customised and based on the different types of 
media. After having done this analysis, the outcomes 
should be reflected in the security measures, keeping 
in mind a balance between ‘costs of implementation, 
security achieved and risk evaluation’, and, 
consequently, on the security procedures. 
However, clause ‘1. Scope’ prevents any 
misunderstanding: ‘This part of ISO 14641 is not 
applicable to information systems in which users have 
the ability to substitute or alter documents after 
capture.’ In other words, it up to the archiving 
organisation to define by itself a set of measures that 
are suitable to prevent the substitution or the 
alteration of documents and to ensure that they can 
be retrieved and legible, that is to counter format and 
media obsolescence. 
This is not a criticism of ISO 14641-1. The point is that, 
unfortunately, not even this ISO standard provides 
digital preservation operators with sufficient 
guidelines on security. The simple pointer to ISO/IEC 
27001 – Information security management, that can 
be found in the previously mentioned NOTE of clause 
5.5.1: ‘For security requirements, reference should be 
made to ISO/IEC 27001 and associated standards’, 
does not help much: arguably, the digital preservation 
domain is so peculiar that it needs a thorough 
customisation of ISO/IEC 27001-27002 with specific 
provisions and guidance. It is this reason that led ETSI 
to draft the two 101 533 documents. 
The ETSI 101 533 family 
The history 
The author of this article proposed the development 
of this type of specification in 2009. The idea was 
submitted to UNINFO, which is a standardisation body 
federated to the Italian official standardisation body 
UNI (Ente Italiano di Normazione). A UNINFO working 
group was launched on 12 June 2009 under the 
heading ‘security in digital (document) preservation’. 
This led ETSI to make an application to the European 
Union to fund a similar effort that was to be 
performed by ETSI itself. The EU Commission agreed, 
and funded an ETSI work group that had its first 
meeting on 15 June 2010. The author acted as the 
coordinator of both work groups, which made it very 
easy to ensure they cooperated. Eventually, in the last 
week of February 2011, both groups finalised the 
content of the specifications. They were, obviously, in 
English, and so ETSI could claim ownership of the 
copyright, by quickly publishing them. ETSI 
subsequently permitted UNI to translate them into 
Italian. This translation was performed between 2011 
and 2012, during which a number of amendments 
were identified and submitted to ETSI. Finally in April 
2012 both ETSI, in English, and UNI, in Italian, 
published the currently available documents. It is to 
be remarked that these documents are based on, and 
refer to, ISO/IEC 27002:2005, so it is necessary to 
 
Security in digital data preservation                                                                                  vvvvvvvv   
 
 
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 11 (2014) | 103 
 
jointly read the ETSI documents and ISO/IEC 
27002:2005. 
Unfortunately, Murphy’s law7 always prevails, so in 
2013, a few months after both ETSI and UNI published 
their sets of documents based on version 2005 of 
ISO/IEC 27001 and 27002, ISO/IEC issued a new 
version of these very standards: ISO/IEC 27001:2013 
and ISO/IEC 27002:2013. Fortunately, the differences 
are not dramatic, so it is not necessary to rush to 
update the ETSI and UNI documents. Therefore, the 
ETSI documents are perfectly valid, provided that the 
reader, with just a little extra effort, keeps an eye also 
on the 2013 versions of ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO/IEC 
27002 when implementing the ETSI documents. 
These documents were funded by the European 
Union, which implied that they were meant to be 
applicable throughout the Europe Union. Thus, 
depositors, or even preservation providers wishing to 
outsource some of their services, may even request 
foreign service providers to demonstrate that they are 
capable of abiding by this specification before 
entrusting them their data objects. They can 
demonstrate this by exhibiting either a suitable 
assessment by a ‘conformity assessment body’, in 
accordance with the recent EU Regulation 910/2014,8 
or, more preferably, the ‘qualified trusted service 
provider’ status awarded by the EUMS relevant 
governmental body. 
A clarification is necessary, though, to prevent 
misunderstandings. The preservation service, referred 
to in the ETSI documents, should be performed by 
skilled organisations, whether in-house or external 
providers. Therefore, it is to be provided by a specific 
‘body’, be it one specific division of a company or an 
external service provider. This depends on two 
factors: 
1. Preservation requires a set of measures 
that a duly skilled body is capable of 
implementing. 
2. If the preservation of digital objects is 
concentrated in one body, individual 
                                                          
7 The Oxford English Dictionary (electronic version) provides a 
definition at 3.3: ‘Murphy’s law: a name humorously given to various 
aphoristic expressions of the apparent perverseness and 
unreasonableness of things (originating from the U.S.)’. In practice it 
means: ‘Anything that can go wrong will go wrong’. 
8 Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust 
services for electronic transactions in the internal market and 
repealing Directive 1999/93/EC, OJ L 257, 28.08.2014, p. 73–114. 
employees should not bear a responsibility for 
preserving the data. If (absurdly) one 
company requires each employee to preserve 
all of their documents without a form of 
central control, it might be impossible to find 
any document in the long run especially if it is 
a large, possibly multinational, company. 
One central preservation site is highly desirable, 
because if the preservation of digital objects is 
delegated to each employee, there will be two risks: 
security measures would probably be applied 
unequally by the various employees, and retrieving 
documents scattered among several persons would 
be difficult – perhaps impossible. 
The specifications 
ETSI TS 101 533-1 
As the title states, this document specifies 
‘Requirements for Implementation and Management’, 
hence the document type ‘TS’, that is, ‘Technical 
Specification’. This Technical Specification structure 
mirrors that of a previous ETSI document: ETSI TS 102 
573, v2.1.1 – Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures 
(ESI); Policy requirements for trust service providers 
signing and/or storing data objects. ETSI TS 101 533-1 
provides provisions on how to securely implement 
and manage a preservation system of digital objects, 
any kind of digital objects: documents (i.e. file types 
readable with Microsoft Office Word or Excel, or pdf 
files), any kind of image files, movie files, Computer 
Aided Design (CAD) files, etc. Additionally, where the 
preservation of digital objects is performed via cloud 
based solutions, the ETSI documents also apply, since 
the prescribed security measures are to be 
implemented on any system used in the cloud. 
Security, and in particular ‘preservation security’ is not 
a trivial issue that should, no: ‘must’ be duly 
implemented. 
Two service types are addressed: 
1. The Core Services, which are mandatory. 
These services provide depositors with the 
basic service of preserving what was 
deposited in an unchanged way for the period 
of time agreed upon. No additional service is 
meant to be performed. If the documents do 
not meet relevant legal rules or any other rule 
relating to the term of retention, or if the 
document format becomes obsolete and can 
no longer be read, the responsibility is not 
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upon the Data Preservation Service Provider 
(DPSP). 
2. Optional services, called ‘Extended 
Services’, that a DPSP may want to provide to 
its customers. Not all of the possible services 
of this kind have been specified in the 
documents: it is simply impossible, since there 
is no limit to the requirements of an individual 
customer. Not all of these services depend on 
the customers’ requirements, although the 
Italian legislation makes some of them 
mandatory. 
Three kinds of provisions are specified for both service 
types: 
‘must’ – provisions marked with such verbal 
form are mandatory: they can be superseded 
only by ‘force majeure’, for example the 
applicable legislation; 
‘recommended/should’ – this form has a 
specific meaning: provisions marked with it 
can be disregarded only after having carefully 
assessed in depth the possible consequences 
of the decision to not abide by the 
recommendation; this assessment and the 
deriving justifications must be documented 
and submitted to auditors (be they internal or 
external) who, when performing an 
assessment or an audit on a DPSP, are 
required to evaluate if these justifications 
suffice; auditors may even refuse to perform 
an audit, should they deem the explanations 
as unsatisfactory; 
‘may/optional’ – the implementation of such 
provisions is for the DPSP to decide. 
The Data Preservation Service is very specific. This led 
ETSI and UNINFO to decide that it was necessary to 
‘customize’ ISO/IEC 27002:2005, which is what is 
called a ‘general purpose’ standard. As a 
consequence, while ETSI TS 101 533-1 assumes that 
all ISO/IEC 27002:2005 measures apply that are by 
default ‘recommended’, in this Technical 
Specification, a number of them are deemed to be 
‘mandatory’, others are deemed as ‘optional’, and yet 
other measures are deemed as ‘not applicable’. 
Additionally, a large number of new measures are 
added that are considered as mandatory, 
recommended or optional. 
A few specific measures relating to the Data 
Preservation Service Provider  
As a first example of these measures, albeit this may 
seem trivial, is a basic requirement on DPSPs to 
ensure that their decisions are independent from their 
service providers’ or customers’ will. Even if a DPSP is 
a department of one company, its decisions must be 
free from undue interference by other departments 
or senior managers. The following example illustrates 
what must not occur. The related preservation logs 
are to be time stamped by a Time Stamping Authority 
(TSA), so it is impossible to tamper with these data 
without it being evident. Imagine that a DPSP 
discovers that a significant mistake occurred a few 
years earlier. In such circumstances, it is impossible to 
rectify the mistake. But if there is an improper 
relationship between a DPSP and the TSA, the DPSP 
might seek to amend the mistake by producing a new 
correct version of the data at issue, by submitting 
them to the TSA and by telling the TSA to ‘stop 
working for a few minutes, change your clock and 
calendar to this time and date I am telling you, then 
apply a time stamp on these new data I am submitting 
you. After having done this you can reset your 
calendar and clock’. Obviously this would be 
unacceptable. 
Another example is that it is necessary to implement 
the separation of roles – this is a normal basic security 
requirement in order to prevent misdeeds. 
Consideration is not given to this elementary point – 
rather the spotlight will focus on two aspects that 
DPSPs must be careful to be aware of. 
1. The development, test and operational 
environments must be separated. While 
separation between the development and 
operations environments is a truism, specific 
attention must be paid on separating the test 
and operational environments. In fact, the 
final acceptance of an application, of a system 
or of one of its HW [hardware] components, is 
more often than not based on a test run on 
the operational data set. This is dangerous for 
at least two reasons: the first, and obvious 
one, is that nobody can be sure that the test 
will not alter the data set. The second reason 
is that during these tests, the input and 
output will be carefully looked through, and 
consequently a data privacy violation may 
occur. As a consequence, before performing 
these tests, the operational data set must be 
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copied in the test environment and, when 
performing this migration, personal data must 
be made anonymous. 
2. The second aspect, trivial though it may 
appear, is that persons that have developed 
HW and/or SW [software] components 
[hardware and software components of a 
system] and submit them to acceptance tests, 
must not participate in such tests in a way 
that enables them to perform undue acts, 
such as altering the tested component 
behaviour so to make the tests appear as 
successful. To repeat, this may appear as 
trivial, but we have to be sure this never 
happens. 
A third example follows. Apart from the usual 
differentiation of access rights among system 
operators, system administrators, data owners, 
auditors and authorities, and the provision of an 
effective access control system to rooms that host 
computing systems storing and operating on the 
preserved data, another caution was specified: 
sensitive operation officers should be given, where 
necessary, credentials to be used when ‘under 
duress’. These credentials would let these officers 
authenticate when forced to do so by non-authorised 
persons, but would activate a ‘forced intrusion’ alarm 
and direct the operations performed by the officer 
into a ‘sandbox’ where whatever action is carried out 
does not affect the real data, but just a simulated set 
of them. 
Another example (as previously hinted at) that 
distinguishes Digital Preservation Systems from paper 
archives, is the possibility to easily set up back up sites 
and disaster recovery sites, even remote ones, in 
order to provide for business continuity. As a 
consequence, TS 101 533-1 requires DPSPs to set up 
remote back up sites and to keep them updated, 
according to a specific plan, and to set up a Disaster 
Recovery Team, which should be made promptly 
available in case of disaster. 
Finally, it is interesting to remark that attention is 
given to a particular kind of malware that was called 
‘Presentation Corruption Agent’ (PCA), that is ‘macros, 
hidden executable code, hidden or difficult to detect 
worksheet formulas and hidden byte sequences that 
are ignored by the originally intended presenting 
application but that can be recognised when the data 
object is processed by different applications’. A PCA 
can actually change a document presentation without 
affecting the document binary content (macros, 
formulas, etc. are included in the document), so it 
cannot be countered by the use of advanced 
electronic signatures. PCAs are therefore particularly 
insidious. Measures against PCAs are obviously 
‘Extended Services’ and are described in clause 6.3.5: 
(i) document formats should not be among those 
indicated by standardisation bodies as suitable to host 
PCA, and (ii) if a DPSP provides this kind of Extended 
Service, it shall have in force suitable procedures to 
verify if deposited documents are free of PCA and 
shall be able to demonstrate these procedures 
effectiveness. The latter is easier said than done. 
In any case the process cannot go beyond the 
preservation of the data and affect how a digital 
object is printed or displayed, for instance. An 
example would be a colour photograph. The data 
comprising the photograph might have preserved the 
image correctly. If the photograph is printed, the 
image might, for instance, be printed in grayscale, and 
not colour, because of the setting on the printer. That 
the photograph has not been printed in colour will not 
affect the preserved image. 
ETSI TR 101 533-2  
This document is addressed to assessors, be they 
internal or external, and, as such, there are neither 
‘must’ nor ‘shall’ provisions: a certified assessor 
should know perfectly well how to conduct an 
assessment. The purpose of this document was only 
to provide assessors with guidance on how to deal 
with assessing this peculiar entity called DPSP. This 
document is structured as a mirror of its sister 
document, TS 101 533-1, so that assessors can easily 
establish the requirements that they should ascertain. 
Assessors will also have to be aware of ISO/IEC 
27002:2005 and of the previously mentioned ETSI TS 
102 573, in order to be aware of what they are 
required to verify, which includes such items as: 
1. The periodic Risk Assessment outcomes are 
promptly reflected in the DPSP Security 
Policies and Procedures. 
2. The organisation chart of the company to 
which the DPSP belongs proves the 
independence of DPSP decisions from any 
undue interference. 
3. The team the DPSP must set up to face 
disasters in order to have a suitable Disaster 
Recovery Plan will operate as such only in case 
of actual disasters or in drills. 
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4. The Disaster Recovery Plan is duly drafted 
and, mainly, tested with periodic drills. 
Conclusions on the ETSI documents  
It is interesting to observe that, although the ETSI 
documents are based on the 2005 version of ISO/IEC 
27001/27002, should a DPSP have a certification 
under ISO/IEC 27001:2013, the provisions in ETSI TS 
101 533-1 still apply. The significant point is that the 
DPSP must implement the measures specified in such 
ETSI document, taking into account the new 2013 
ISO/IEC 27002 version. There could be some measures 
that did not exist in the 2005 version, the 
implementation of which should be assessed by the 
DPSP itself, without a TS 101 533-1 ‘supporting 
opinion’. 
Italian technical and legal provisions 
It has been noted above that UNINFO and ETSI have 
worked together, and that ETSI acquired the copyright 
on the ‘101 533’ by being the first to publish them. It 
has also been noted that UNINFO/UNI was authorized 
to translate them into Italian. What was not 
mentioned is that UNI/UNINFO was authorized by 
ETSI to develop and publish a third document, 
containing a number of Italian-specific provisions for 
the purposes of the Italian legal and customary 
‘world’. The purpose is to integrate the ETSI TS 101 
533-01 and ETSI TR 101 533-02 into the Italian legal 
and customary environment. A few of these addenda 
requirements are indicated as mandatory, even for 
assessors, among which is the obligation to provide a 
DPSP with the result of assessments conducted on its 
suppliers of services related to the provision of Digital 
Preservation Services. 
From the legislation viewpoint, it is interesting to 
remark that in Italy a Decree by the President of the 
Council of Ministers (DPCM) issued on 3/12/2013, 
published in the Italian Official Journal on 12/3/2014, 
is entirely dedicated to digital document preservation, 
and that both ETSI TS 101 533-1 and ETSI TR 101 533-
02 are among the standards and specifications listed 
in the decree as suitable to meet the requirements of 
the Decree. In other words, in Italy, if a DPSP abides 
by these ETSI Specifications, it is deemed as 
conforming to the DPCM requirements in order to 
achieve accreditation by the specific governmental 
body, the Agenzia per l’Italia Digitale. It is possible to 
argue that this accreditation is a minor issue, but it is 
to be taken into account that public administrations 
can entrust the preservation of their digital 
documents to a private DPSP only if the latter is 
accredited. For this reason, accreditation is of 
particular importance to DPSPs and, therefore, ETSI TS 
101 533-1 is important too. 
Finally, on 10 April 2014, Agenzia per l’Italia Digitale 
issued what is called a ‘Circular letter’ specifying the 
methods with which preservation service providers 
can be accredited by the Agenzia, and how the 
Agenzia must behave in accrediting and inspecting 
such providers. Because this ‘Circular letter’ is so 
recent, there is no finalised accreditation yet, but a 
number of preservation service providers are at work 
to set up their security measures consistently with all 
the relevant requirements, including ETSI TS 101 533-
01. The process is on! 
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